The Short Stirling bomber

Short Stirling

Type:            Heavy bomber
Engines:        4 x 1600hp Bristol Hercules XI
Wingspan:        99ft 1in
Length:        87ft 3in
Height:        22ft 9in
Weight:        Empty     44,000lb
            Loaded    70,000lb
Armament        8 x 0.303in machine guns in nose, dorsal and tail turrets
Bombload;        14,000lb of bombs
Max speed:        270mph
Ceiling:        17,000ft
Range:        2010 miles
Production:        2,371

The Stirling got off to a bad start in May 1939 when the first prototype crashed on its maiden flight. Redesign followed, producing the final shape of this the first four engined bomber to enter service with the RAF. It started service amid high hopes that it would prove to be a decisive aircraft for Bomber Command. It could carry a heavier bombload than any other aircraft in service and had a useful range, enabling it to reach many targets. Later in the war the low ceiling began to cause problems, as did the layout of the bomb bay which meant the Stirling could carry only smaller bombs. In 1943 the aircraft began to be replaced as a bomber. The existing Stirlings were converted to be glider tugs or long-distance transport aircraft.

from HEROES OF RAF BOMBER COMMAND IN LINCOLNSHIRE by Rupert Matthews

The RAF adopts area bombing - 1942

When Peirse was dismissed as head of Bomber Command, neither Portal nor Churchill had decided who would take his place. As a temporary measure the popular commander of 3 Group, Air Vice Marshal Jack Baldwin, was moved to assume control. Baldwin was told not to introduce any major changes, so he continued with the pattern of raids already established. So far as Norfolk was concerned, this meant attacking coastal targets with Blenheim squadrons and pushing deeper in to Germany with Wellingtons.

There was, however, one major strategic change that occurred during Baldwin’s time in command. The government approved a new operational directive to govern Bomber Command’s actions. It reached Baldwin on 14 February and ordered him to direct the main weight of Bomber Command into what were known as Area Bombing raids on major German industrial cities for the next six months.

The new directive had grown out of the Butt Report of the previous year. It was recognised that bomber crews, flying at night, simply could not identify individual factories or installations. Indeed, some crews did well if they identified the right town. In effect Bomber Command was being told to abandon any attempt to find and destroy individual targets at night – although day bombers operating along the enemy coast would still be directed at such targets. Instead Area Bombing involved identifying areas that were large enough so that the crews could be relied upon to find them and that contained enough economic or transportation targets to ensure that some at least would be hit by bombers striking the area. Since the majority of factories and rail junctions tend to lie in towns and cities, the Area Bombing directive effectively pointed Bomber Command at pounding industrial cities. Even if the precise targets themselves were missed, the destruction of nearby buildings would block roads and rail links, effectively making the factories unproductive for some days. Moreover the destruction of housing near the factories would mean that the workers had nowhere to live, further disrupting war production.

The fact that such cities were packed with civilians did not bother the RAF. Britain and Germany were engaged in a total war. The civilians in such cities were workers in factories producing guns, aircraft and munitions of all kinds. Killing them was considered a legitimate activity. In any case, as it was seen at the time, the Germans had started it with their indiscriminate bombing of Warsaw, Coventry, London and a dozen other cities. For the rest of the war, Bomber Command would have as its main priority the destruction of Germany’s ability to equip, feed and maintain its armed forces.

What the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, needed was a man willing and able to put this new strategy into destructive effect. On 22 February 1942 he found his man in the shape of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris – soon to be better known as ‘Bomber Harris’.

from HEROES OF RAF BOMBER COMMAND IN NORFOLK by Rupert Matthews

The Scots Army at the Battle of Neville's Cross, 1346

King David had made great efforts to call out as much of Scotland’s army as possible before marching south. In theory at least the main body of the army was expected to assemble within 8 days of the King calling a muster, but in practice the units from more distant areas would take longer to arrive. Nevertheless, David probably marched with the majority of his Lowland troops. The Lord of the Isles, still semi-independent at this time, did not call out his troops so there were no Highlanders nor Islanders in the Scottish army.

The troops the English met at Neville’s Cross would have been familiar to them from earlier encounters at Halidon Hill and Falkirk. The bulk of the army were infantry armed with spears, shields and helmets and a fair number would have had mail or scale armour jackets. It is unlikely that David would have brought many of the ‘Small Folk’ with him. These were poor men expected to serve equipped with only a spear or axe. Such men were unmounted and David was on a looting raid, which demands speed of movement.

David did, however, have about 2,000 knights and armoured horsemen in his army. By this date the chain mail suits and large, round helmets of previous battles were going out of favour. The head of a knight was now more likely to be protected by a sphere-like helmet called a bascinet with a moveable visor over the face. The body was still protected largely by chain mail and the shield, but the legs and arms were now being covered in plates of steel.

The Scottish army also had the French troops sent by King Philip. It is not clear exactly how many such men were at Neville’s Cross, but there were certainly fewer than 500. These men would have been equipped with spears, swords and shields much like the Scots infantry, though the spears would have been shorter at around 10 feet compared to 14 for the Scots. The key difference was in armour. The French would have worn full suits of chain mail and heavy, enclosed helmets. Over the armour was worn leg and arm guards of tough leather, often with metal plates attached.

from ENGLAND VS SCOTLAND by Rupert Matthews

Battle of Thermopylae 480bc - the Phocian Wall

The picture of the Phocian Wall so far is clear, it was a stone wall some 12 feet tall with a parapet wall along the top and a gateway on its landward end. But there is a serious problem as to its actual site. On the southern end the wall would have been built flush to the almost sheer mountainside, but at the northern end the sea gave a much less secure flank. The coast here was one of sandy beaches, and it is impossible to build a stone wall on a sand beach without it collapsing in the first storm to hit. Any attackers would simply need to wade into the sea to their waists and walk around the right flank of any wall built at the Middle Gate.

Clearly the Persians did not succeed in doing this, so the Phocian Wall cannot have just stopped at the edge of the beach. The easiest solution would have been to bend the wall back as it approached the sea. This would have meant that any troops seeking to outflank the wall by walking in the waves would have exposed their vulnerable, shieldless right side to the defenders. The wall need have been built back along the shore for only about 50 metres or so to be effective.

Alternatively, the builders of the wall may have relied upon temporary defences to render the surf impassible to hostile infantry. It would have been relatively easy to make wooden fencing, bristling with thorns. Weighted down with stones, these would have remained in position in the sea for some weeks before being washed away and were easily replaced when they did. Such a barrier would not have been impassable to determined men, but it would have been a slow job to cut it down with axes. The defenders would, of course, have used this delay to inflict casualties on the men seeking to cut a way through the fencing.

from THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLAE by Rupert Matthews

The Spanish Armada abandons the galleon Nuestra Senora del Rosario

As dusk came on on 21 July Don Pedro de Valdes was still trying to repair his  battered  Nuestra Senora del Rosario after she had accidentally collided with another ship. He later recorded what occurred next:

“The sea did rise in such sort that my ship having struck sail and wanting her halyard of the foremast, being withal but badly built, did work so extremely as shortly after and before it could be remedied, her foremast brake close by the hatches and fell upon the mainmast, so as it was impossible to repair that hurt but in some good space of time. I did again send word thereof several times to the Duke [Medina Sidonia]; and discharged three or four great guns to the end that all the fleet might know what distress I was in, praying him either to appoint some ship or galleass to tow me or to direct me what other course I should take.”

Two pataches came up to the stricken ship. One asked for news, then slipped off to the San Martin to explain to Medina Sidonia what was happening. A tow rope was got to the  Nuestra Senora del Rosario by a galleon, but it quickly parted in the choppy seas. After some time and with no word from the flagship, Don Pedro ordered a senior monk, Bernado de Gongora, to get into the second patache and go to beg for help. With him he took four Englishmen who were sailing in the Armada, three more remained behind.

Brother Bernado arrived on the San Martin to find an argument taking place between the senior commanders. Medina Sidonia had sent orders to a galleass to go over to the  Nuestra Senora del Rosario and take her in tow. Captain Ojeda, commanding the vice flagship of the Andalusians San Francisco, was hovering nearby awaiting orders how to help out.

Diego Flores, the admiral Medina Sidonia had chosen to advise him on naval matters, now took a hand. He pointed out to Medina Sidonia that the freshening wind and choppy waters were making it difficult for the ungainly storeships to keep in position. The warships too were drifting out of position. With darkness coming on, Diego Flores warned, the Armada was taking a risk staying where it was. A hostile fleet was not far away in one direction, a hostile shore not far in another. If the defensive formation broke up the Armada would be at the mercy of the English and their long range guns.

Diego Flores urged that the Armada had to get under way so that the ships could get steerage way and so keep formation. The crippled  Nuestra Senora del Rosario could be left with the galleass, the San Francisco and some pataches. If she could not be saved, she could be abandoned.

Eventually, Medina Sidonia agreed and gave the necessary orders. The Armada got underway, leaving the  Nuestra Senora del Rosario and her little cluster of helpers behind. Leaving a wounded companion to the enemy is never popular with an army or navy. It tells every man present that if he is wounded, or his ship damaged, he will be left in his turn. The decision served to demoralise the men of the Armada. Nobody was in any doubt who to blame. Diego Flores was known to have a feud with Don Pedro de Flores. The move was regarded as shameful.




from THE SPANISH ARMADA - A CAMPAIGN IN CONTEXT by Rupert Matthews

Sicilian Siege Engines 480bc

In the years after 500bc new siege weapons were developed. Dionysius, the ruler of Syracuse in Sicily, went so far as to establish an official armaments factory that had a section dedicated to developing new siege weapons. One of the inventions this establishment produced was the siege tower. This was, effectively, a mobile mound. It consisted of a wooden tower mounted on wheels. Ladders inside the tower gave easy access from the ground to the top. At the top was a drawbridge that could be let down on to the enemy walls. All the attackers then needed to do was swarm up the ladders and dash over the drawbridge to enter the fortress. It had the advantage that it could be pushed into position before the defenders could heighten their walls, as they could do against a mound.

Dionysius’ workshop also produced the gastraphetes, or winched bow. This consisted of an enormously powerful wooden bow mounted on a stand. The bow was too powerful for any human to draw. Instead it was equipped with a ratchet system operated by a winch so that the bow could be pulled back gradually by teams of workers. It fired an arrow much heavier than that used by conventional hand bows over a far greater distance, perhaps as much as 300 metres.

from THE BATTLE OF THE GRANICUS by Rupert Matthews

King Edward III's invasion of France moves on from Caen, 1346

Caen Castle Gateway

On 31 August 1346 the English army turned their backs on the shattered city of Caen and headed east towards Rouen, where King Philip was gathering a mighty French army to defeat them.

The landscape through which the English marched was eerily empty and silent. The delay at Caen had given the local French plenty of time to evacuate the villages and smaller towns, taking everything of value with them. The business of chevauchée still demanded that desolation be inflicted, so all buildings except churches were set on fire and anything that could be found was destroyed.

Edward left a small force at Caen to watch Bertrand and his garrison in the castle. The Acta Bellicosa calls these “a few men”, while Richard Wynkeley and Bartholomew Burghersh fail to mention them at all. Given that Bertrand had some 3,000 men with him, it is unlikely that Edward gave his few men orders either to lay siege to the castle or to try to defeat Bertrand in battle if he sallied out. Presumably they were to hang about to keep an eye on things for a while, then ride off to find Edward or put to sea down the Orne.

The French made much of the fact that when Bertrand sallied out he defeated Edward’s covering force with ease. But then the French were in need of some good news.

The 1 August 1346 was spent by King Edward III getting the army and its lengthy supply train across the River Dives and its adjacent marshes and swamps. There was just one narrow road across the soft ground, so the carts had to go in single file while the men splashed along beside them. 

from THE BATTLE OF CRECY, A CAMPAIGN IN CONTEXT by Rupert Matthews